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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900166
Priority No. 2

WILFRED A. VIGIL, JR. ,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Mr. Vigil refers this Court to his opening brief for the
statements of jurisdiction, the issue, standard of review, the
facts, and the case. Appellant's opening brief at 1-3.

The actual

facts alleged by the State are not necessary for this Court to
resolve the legal issue presented in this interlocutory appeal.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Model Penal Code, Utah case law, and case law from
other jurisdictions support Mr. Vigil's argument that attempted
depraved indifference homicide does not constitute an offense.
actual intent to kill—not a mental state of equivalent
culpability—is required for an attempted murder.

ARGUMENT
POINT. CASE LAW AND THE MODEL PENAL CODE SUPPORT
MR. VIGIL'S ARGUMENT THAT ATTEMPTED DEPRAVED
INDIFFERENCE HOMICIDE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN
OFFENSE.

An

The State argues that "Utah's attempt statute, section
76-4-101, is derived from the Model Penal Code," and that a comment
to Model Penal Code, art. 5, § 501 (1985) ("M.P.C.") suggests that
attempted depraved indifference murder is a viable crime in Utah.
See State's brief at 8-10.

In making such an argument, the State

misreads the portion of the comment which it quotes on pages 8-9 of
its brief and fails to read the comment as a whole.
In State v. Pearson, 680 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1984)
(per curiam), this Court stated:
The statute adopts the definition of an "attempt"
employed in the Model Penal Code, §5.01, purposed
on drawing the line further away from the final
act and enlarging the common law concept.
While Utah's statute adopts the M.P.C. definition of
attempt, the statute is not a verbatim replica of the M.P.C.
§ 5.01(1) states:
Section 5.01. Criminal Attempt
(1) Definition of Attempt. A person is
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting
with the kind of culpability otherwise required
for commission of the crime, he:
(a) purposely engages in conduct that
would constitute the crime if the attendant
circumstances were as he believes them to
be; or
(b) when causing a particular result is
an element of the crime, does or omits to do
anything with the purpose of causing or with
the belief that it will cause such result
without further conduct on his part; or
(c) purposely does or omits to do
anything that, under the circumstances as he
believes them to be, is an act or omission
constituting a substantial step in a course
of conduct planned to culminate in his
commission of the crime.
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M.P.C.

By contrast, Utah's attempt statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-4-101 (1990), states in pertinent part:
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty
of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with
the kind of culpability otherwise required for
the commission of the offense, he engages in
conduct constituting a substantial step toward
commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not
constitute a substantial step unless it is
strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to
commit the offense.
The portion of the comment to M.P.C. § 5.01 quoted by the
State on pages 8-9 of its brief refers specifically to subsection
1(b) of M.P.C. § 5.01.

The language in subsection 1(b) was not

adopted by this state.
Subsection 1(b) deals with situations where the actor has
the purpose of causing a specific result or the belief that his
conduct will cause a specific result; in a depraved indifference
situation, the actor merely knows that his conduct creates a grave
risk of death, not that it will cause a death.1
Furthermore, the portion of the comment quoted by the State
refers to a factual scenario which does not constitute depraved
indifference.

The comment states that:

[A]n actor commits an attempt when he does or
omits to do anything with the purpose of causing
"or with the belief that it will cause" such
result without further conduct on his part.

1. In a situation where the actor knows his conduct will cause a
death, a charge under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a) rather than
§ 76-5-203(1)(c) is appropriate.
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Thus, a belief that death will ensue from the
actor#s conduct . . . will suffice, as well as
would a purpose to bring about the results.
(emphasis added).

M.P.C, art. 5, § 501.

The example quoted by the State involves a situation where
the actor knows that death will result as the "inevitable
consequence" of the actor's conduct.

The comment points out that

"the concept of 'intent' has always been an ambiguous one and might
be thought to include results that the actor believed to be the
inevitable consequence of his conduct."

Id. at 305.

In other

words, under the circumstances outlined in the quote on pages 8-9 of
the State's brief, the actor may well have "intended" the death;
this is distinct from depraved indifference which requires only a
knowledge by the actor that he or she has created a grave risk of
death.

See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984).
In addition, as the State acknowledges on page 9 of its

brief,"[o]nly a minority of recent revisions have explicitly
followed the Model Penal Code on this point" (citing M.P.C. at 305).
Finally, in relying on the quoted passage, the State fails
to consider the remainder of the same comment.

Immediately prior to

the quoted passage, the comment points out that where an actor
engages in conduct which recklessly or negligently creates a risk of
death, "[t]he approach of the Model Penal Code is not to treat such
behavior as an attempt."

Id. at 304.

More importantly, immediately following the passage quoted
by the State, the comment states:
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Since a particular crime must actually be
intended, the charge must be precise and must not
permit the jury to convict the actor on one of
several mental states. Thus when the charge is
attempted murder or assault with intent to kill,
it is error to permit conviction on a finding of
reckless disregard for human life (footnote
omitted) or intent to inflict grievous bodily
harm (footnote omitted). And since a conviction
for murder can be premised on either of these
mental states - as well as on intent to kill - it
is improper to say that one can be convicted of
attempted murder if he could have been convicted
of murder had the victim died. There must be a
specific intent to kill.
Id. at 306-7 (emphasis added).

This passage not only clarifies that

intent to kill is required for an attempted murder charge under the
Model Penal Code, it also refutes the broad policy argument made by
the State in closing.

See State's brief at 13.

The State also argues that in State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390
(Utah 1989), this Court really meant to say that attempted murder
"requires an intent to kill or a mental state equivalent thereto"
(State's brief at 8).

Such a position ignores the clear language of

Bell, the rationale behind the Bell decision, and the rationale of
the decisions explicitly relied on by this Court in reaching its
decision in Bell.
As Mr. Vigil pointed out in his opening brief at 7-8, in
Bell, this Court stated that to be guilty of an attempt, one must
intend to consummate the crime and that to be guilty of an attempted
murder, one must intend to kill.

Appellant's opening brief at 7-8;

Bell, 785 P.2d at 394. Nothing in Bell supports the State's
assertion that this Court meant to include mental states which are
equivalent to intent to kill; although the State claims that in
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Bell, this "Court emphasized that felony murder, insofar as the
homicide is concerned, does not require proof of any culpable mental
state" (State's brief at 7), no such emphasis occurs in Bell.
Instead, this Court emphasized the requirement that one intend to
kill in order to be guilty of an attempted murder.

Bell, 785 P.2d

at 393-4.2
The cases relied upon by this Court in reaching its
decision in Bell also refute the State's argument that a specific
intent to kill is not required for attempted murder.
P.2d at 393.

See Bell, 785

State v. Huff, 469 A.2d 1251 (Me. 1984), does not

involve felony-murder; instead, the Huff court discussed the
"logical impossibility" of attempted murder based on a "knowing"
mental state.

469 A.2d at 1253.

The State attempts to distinguish Huff by arguing that the
Maine statute has an additional sentence which requires the "intent
to complete the commission of the crime."
footnote 7.

State's brief at 10,

However, the State acknowledges the argument that the

"extra" sentence in the Maine statute is "essentially the same as
[the language] which appears in subsection (2) of section
76-4-101."

State's brief at 10. Case law from this Court

demonstrates that Utah's attempt statute requires an intent to
consummate the target offense.
292 (Utah 1986).

See State v. Harmon, 612 P.2d 291,

In addition, this Court has already decided that

2. In at least five places in the Bell decision, this Court
mentioned the necessity of the actor having an intent to kill in
order to be convicted of attempted murder. 785 P.2d at 393-4.
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Maine's attempt statute is similar to Utah's attempt statute.

Bell,

785 P.2d at 393. Hence, the State's attempts to distinguish this
Court's reliance on Huff are not convincing.
Furthermore, the State does not even attempt to distinguish
the cases cited by this Court for the proposition that "numerous
courts have held that the crime of attempted murder requires a
specific intent to kill."

Bell, 785 P.2d at 393, footnote 13. For

example, in People v. Mitchell, 424 N.E.2d 658, 661 (111. App.
1981), the court stated:
The offense of attempt (murder) requires the
mental state of specific intent to commit
murder. Knowledge that the consequences of an
act may result in death or grave bodily injury,
or intent to do bodily harm is not enough,
[citation omitted]
In State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 259 (Utah 1988), this
Court made the following statement:
These terms [the four culpable mental states
listed in the second degree murder statute] are
comparable to the old malice aforethought, but
are much more precise and less confusing. The
statute treats these forms of homicides as having
similar culpability. Second degree murder is
based on a very high degree of moral
culpability. That culpability arises either from
an actual intent to kill or from a mental state
that is essentially equivalent thereto—such as
intending grievous bodily injury and knowingly
creating a very high risk of death. The risk of
death in the latter two circumstances must be so
great as to evidence such an indifference to life
as to be tantamount to that evidenced by an
intent to kill. In contrast, the felony-murder
provision of the second degree murder statute is
something of an exception to the above principle,
as it does not recruire an intent to kill or any
other similar mental state.

The State latches onto the last sentence quoted above, and
argues that because felony-murder does not involve a mental state
similar to that of intent to kill, the rationale of Bell is not
applicable to attempted depraved murder.

Regardless of whether

felony-murder involves a level of culpability similar to that of
intent to kill, the repeated references in Bell to the necessity of
an intent to kill in order to be convicted of attempted murder are
applicable in the depraved indifference context; in Bell, this Court
did not base its decision on the idea that one who commits a
felony-murder has a lesser degree of culpability than one who is
charged with attempted depraved indifference.
decision on the lack of intent to kill.

Instead, it based its

See discussion supra at 6.

In addition, the meaning of the quoted Standiford paragraph
is not clear.

At the outset of the paragraph, this Court pointed

out that the statute treats the various forms of second degree
murder as having similar culpability and that a high degree of
culpability is required for second degree murder.

An individual who

intentionally commits one of the serious felonies specified in
§ 76-5-203(1)(d) resulting in a death certainly has a level of
culpability on par with one who knowingly creates a risk of death.
The dictum in the last sentence should not be used as a basis for
backtracking on this Court's straightforward message in Bell,
State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237 (Utah 1978), and State v. Howell, 649
P.2d 91 (Utah 1982), that an intent to kill is required in order to
be convicted of attempted homicide.

(See Appellant's opening brief

at 8.)
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The majority of cases addressing the issue have determined
that an intent to kill is necessary in order to convict for
attempted murder.
cited therein).

See State v. Bell, 785 P.2d at 393-4 (and cases
Courts which have addressed the issue of whether

depraved indifference murder exists have found that such a crime is
a "logical impossibility" since it requires that the actor intend to
commit an unintended killing.

See State v. Johnson, 707 P.2d 1174,

1177 (N.M. App. 1985); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 310 Pa. Super. 39,
456 A.2d 171 (1983).
The only case cited by the State in support of its argument
that some states have held that the crime of attempted depraved
indifference murder exists is People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932 (Colo.
1983).

See State's brief at 11. However, the decision in Castro is

based on the court's belief that the defendant's argument was
"constructed on a faulty premise, namely, that the crime of extreme
indifference murder entails an unintentional and inchoate act."
Castro, 657 P.2d at 937.

The Castro court discussed at length the

requirement under the Colorado extreme indifference statute that the
defendant intentionally engage in conduct that created a grave risk
of death to another, and based its decision on this intent
requirement.

Hence, Castro is distinguishable since no intent

requirement exists under the Utah depraved indifference statute.
Furthermore, the reasoning of the Castro court is not convincing.
Although Mr. Vigil acknowledges that this Court has held
that depraved indifference is a mental state which is equivalent in
moral culpability to a specific intent to kill (see Appellant's
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opening brief at 6), it does not require an actual intent to kill.
Attempted depraved indifference is therefore a legal impossibility.
The State acknowledges that Mr. Vigil's argument is
straightforward; Mr. Vigil's argument is supported by the language
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101, case law from this Court, the Model
Penal Code, and the majority of case law from other jurisdictions.
Mr. Vigil respectfully requests that this Court follow its decisions
in Normanf Howell and Bell and require an intent to kill—not a
mental state of equivalent culpability—in order to be guilty of
attempted murder.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Vigil respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
order of the trial court, grant his Motion to Dismiss and Amend, and
remand the case to the trial court with an order that Count III of
the Information be dismissed and Count II be amended so as to delete
the allegation that Mr. Vigil committed an attempted depraved
indifference homicide.

SUBMITTED this IS^H day of May, 1991.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

JAMES C. BRADSHAW
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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